Abstract. Norms are a pervasive feature of national political systems but their influence goes well beyond the boundaries of the state. They affect political outcomes by shaping the strategies that political actors use to advance their interests. Norms do so by shaping the terms of the debates that underpin political decision making. Unlike existing literature that focuses on the importance of persuasion, this article demonstrates that through the mechanism of rhetorical action, norms induce self-interested political actors to adapt their strategy and accept political change (here, institutional reform) that they would normally oppose. The case of the advent of the Convention on the Future of Europe examined here shows that by considering the impact of norms on the behaviour of the opponents of change, ideational analyses can incorporate agency in the explanation of political change.
Introduction
-2 -The debate regarding the explanatory capacity of norms and other ideational factors has become a central feature of the study of international relations (see, e.g., Checkel, 1997; Finnemore, 1996; Goldstein and Keohane, 1993b; Klotz, 1995; Kratochwil, 1989) .
Nonetheless, the autonomous impact of such factors has been contested. Sceptics argue that this impact is epiphenomenal and that interests are the real causes of political change. Implicit in this sceptical argument is the notion that one can (indeed must) separate ideational factors from interests, the latter being exogenously defined. This view has been challenged on the basis of the counter-argument that ideational factors mould the way in which political actors perceive -or even define -the interests that they seek to advance (Finnemore, 1996; Sikkink, 1991) .
The motivation for this article stems from two sources. First, it comes in response to calls for more careful specification of causal claims and mechanisms and empirical evidence of the ways in which ideational factors shape political outcomes (Checkel, 1998: 325; Finnemore and Sikkink, 1998: 890; Berman, 2001: 233) . Second, existing constructivist accounts of international politics (Kratochwil, 1989; Risse, 2000) highlight the importance of persuasion as a key mechanism but norms, it is argued here, affect political outcomes even in the absence of evidence of persuasion.
The importance of the problem solving and legitimating properties of norms has been demonstrated (see Dimitrakopoulos, 2005) , but more work is required in an effort to identify the mechanism that links them to political change. Indeed, how is everyday political action linked to norms (Dimitrakopoulos, 2005: 691) ? This article seeks to illustrate that rhetorical action (Schimmelfennig, 1997; performs this role and it -3 -goes beyond the international arena since it has an important domestic dimension that has hitherto not been explored. Norms are important in that respect because -as this article will demonstrate -they link the domestic with the international arena and provide a yardstick against which political action in one arena is assessed by constituencies that operate in the other.
Specifically, this article demonstrates that norms affect institutional change by moulding the strategies that political actors use in an effort to promote their interests.
Norms do so by combining problem solving capacity and the legitimacy that they lend to some forms of political action (Dimitrakopoulos, 2005) but these characteristics affect -by means of rhetorical action, the key mechanism discussed here -the opponents of reform who have the motives, power, and opportunity to veto change but did not do so, despite the absence of side payments. Thus, this article is an attempt to contribute to a better understanding of (i) how the opponents of reform align their activity and (ii) agency in ideational accounts of political change.
The first section of the article presents the theoretical framework and identifies the mechanisms through which norms affect political outcomes. The next two sections provide the empirical evidence and a systematic discussion of alternative explanations of the case examined here. The final section of the article concludes and advances two broader claims on norms-based arguments.
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Norms and Political Change

Theoretical Considerations
Norms are construed here as principled beliefs that turn broad fundamental doctrines into guidance for human action and thus generate collective expectations about appropriate behaviour (Goldstein and Keohane, 1993a: 9; Jepperson, Wendt and Katzenstein, 1996: 54) . Constitutive norms establish actors' identities, regulative norms shape behaviour by defining standards of appropriate action but together they constitute a historically defined 'normative order', a structure of meaning and scheme of interpretation that moulds political action (March and Olsen, 1989: 107) .
Although much of the debate on the impact of norms on politics focuses on their influence on the definition of identities and interests, less is known about their impact on the strategies of action chosen by self-interested actors. The empirical section of this article will demonstrate that norms organise action by linking an actor's perceived interests with an appropriate strategy for the pursuit of these interests. They influence political processes by solving problems and by providing standards that legitimise some forms of action, but not others (Kratochwil, 1989: 34; Dimitrakopoulos, 2005) . This is not achieved in a vacuum. Rather, it is the result of the public function of norms, i.e. their strategic deployment in the domain where the political process unfolds. When norms are deployed in a sustained manner -especially in the context of the public debate that often underpins political processes -they structure the debate between selfinterested political actors and, by consequence, shape its outcomes. Thus, instead of being eliminated, agency is channelled. Political actors choose strategies with reference -5 -to both their perceptions of their own interests and the norms that underpin the political context (domestic and international) in which they operate.
Rhetorical action -i.e. 'the strategic use of norm-based arguments' (Schimmelfennig 2001: 48) -is of central importance in this process. It is the mechanism that links norms with some solutions to political problems and actors' perceived interests. Existing work stresses that rhetorical action affects political outcomes by promoting persuasion. For example, Risse notes that 'actors use arguments to persuade or convince others that they should change their views ' (2000: 8; see also Kratochwil, 1989: 36) . Arguably, this is not the only way in which rhetorical action affects political outcomes. The opponents of norm-based change are not necessarily persuaded by it. Rather, the normative power of the argument that they oppose induces them to seek different strategies for the promotion of their interests. The deployment of norms in the context of democratic politics may not determine substantive preferences -i.e. what actors want when they are faced with a given political problem -but, as the empirical material of this article will demonstrate, it explains what answer is given to this problem by inducing them to reject some strategies and opt for others.
Successful rhetorical action entails the use of norms that force actors to adapt their strategies not because they are convinced about the merit of other actors' substantive views but because they cannot afford to be seen to go against the norms that provide the basis of these views. Rhetorical action is successful not only when it leads to initially sceptical actors being convinced about the validity of their opponents' views, but also when it sets boundaries to political action. In the latter case, as this article will seek to -6 - demonstrate, it defines a position as being beyond the boundary of what is politically acceptable (Burns, 1999: 171) .
The impact of norms of the choice of strategy is evident in the public nature of a significant part of democratic politics. In a public deliberative setting -e.g. a constitutional convention -recourse to naked self-interest or prejudice is inadmissible.
'Even self-interested actors are forced or induced to argue in terms of public interest' (Elster, 1998b: 12) . Once public-spirited rationales have been offered in the discussion, voting in public for narrow self-interest 'would be an embarrassing contradiction for most' (Fearon, 1998: 54) i.e. a politically untenable option. In fact, this constraint -'the civilising force of hypocrisy' in Elster's terms -may even prevent self-interested proposals from appearing on the voting agenda.
Norms exert influence both during prolonged periods of political stability and in periods of crisis and overt contestation. In the latter case, they are the 'yardstick' used for the assessment of alternative solutions to political problems. The instrumental use of a norm creates a normative lock-in effect in that it raises expectations about its use in the future, especially in comparable circumstances. Given that inconsistency affects credibility (Schimmelfennig, 2001) , political actors who have relied on a norm in the past are induced to either do so again, or at least refrain from violating it in the future.
The other facet of the function of norms as a benchmark entails the classification of responses to political problems on the basis of their compatibility with the frequentlyinvoked norm. The responses that are compatible with the norm remain relevant while others are quickly rejected. Moreover, discussing policy development in the EU Paul Pierson (1996: 123) has demonstrated that 'losses of control result not only from the autonomous actions of supranational organizations, but from member-state preoccupation with short-term concerns, the ubiquity of unintended consequences, and the instability of member-state policy preferences'.
Although national governments retained the right to make the final decisions in the context of the IGC that was planned to follow the end of the Convention's proceedings, they took the unanimous decision to create an institution which was capable -because of its membership and modus operandi -of presenting them with a politically legitimate fait accompli from which it would ultimately be very hard to distance themselves. In addition, despite the wishes of sceptical 2 national governments, the Convention was vested with the power not only to consider the key issues regarding the Union's future development but also to identify possible responses. As regards its agenda, there were to be no taboos (Financial Times, 17 December 2001: 20) . Clearly, this was a risky (Wessels, 2001 ) course of action for risk-averse governments and this is further highlighted by the fact that the 'politicisation' of the treaty reform process was an -9 - explicit objective of the promoters of change who wanted to bypass diplomats whose action is constrained by the mandate that they have (interview, Brussels, 30 April 2004) .
In more general terms, the advent of the Convention marks a significant shift in the balance between the EU's two sources of legitimacy namely, the nation state and European citizens. While the IGC method privileges the former, the establishment of the Convention clearly enhanced the latter because it brought together representatives of (inter alia) national parliaments, the Commission and the (directly elected) European Parliament (EP) and gave to representatives of civil society a point of entry into EU 'constitutional politics'. Crucially, unlike the IGC model -which relies explicitly on diplomatic bargaining -the Convention model resonates directly with the norm of transparent deliberation and democratically accountable governance that is part of the normative order that permeates both the EU and the member states.
Arguably, the puzzle concerns primarily the opponents, rather than the initial promoters of change. Governments had the motives, power and opportunity to veto this reform but they did not do so despite their initial strong opposition to this change, the fact that 'nobody knew initially what the Convention was going to do and be like' (interview, Brussels, 7 July 2003a) and the absence of a broader package deal (Ludlow, 2002: 59; Magnette, 2002: 8) . Why did they align their views with the supporters of establishment of the Convention? The importance of this question is further highlighted by the fact that the new process of treaty reform affected both the domestic process of preference formation (Dimitrakopoulos and Kassim, 2004) as well as a part of the subsequently agreed Treaty (Closa, 2004; Magnette and Nicolaïdis, 2004) However, even if one assumes that these interests were defined exogenously -i.e.
without reference to the EU context, they cannot explain by themselves (i.e. without recourse to the norm of transparent and democratically accountable governance) the specific form of the new arrangement that was adopted a year later. After all, other alternatives 4 that were better placed to serve the interests of the sceptics were available but were rejected.
An institutionalist account would not generate better results for four reasons. First, national governments could not control the Convention -they were in a minority.
Second, they were aware of the history of unintended consequences produced by EUlevel organisations in general and the Convention method in particular. Third, the growing power of the directly elected EP -itself an indication of the increasing importance of the norm discussed here -was not popular amongst government elites many of whom believe that EU politics must remain in the hands of governments.
Finally, given the unanimity requirement, this reform could have been vetoed.
The next section highlights the presence and the increasing (since the late 1980s)
importance of the norms of transparent and democratic governance at the level of the EU, the failure of the IGC method to provide satisfactory solutions to the crucial issue of institutional reform and, finally, the creation of the new mechanism, i.e. the Convention on the Future of Europe.
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The Establishment of the Convention on the Future of Europe
Democratic Governance and Transparency in the EU
Although the concept of representation has enabled the transfer of the democratic principle from the city state to the nation state, the second transformation of democracy was marked by the advent of transnational systems of governance that increased the perceived distance between citizens and the loci where power is exercised (Dahl, 1994: 26) . Assessed in terms of the exercise of democracy and transparent decision making, At the same time, the issue of transparency was attracting increasing importance at the level of the EU in part as a result of the accession of Sweden and Finland in 1995.
Although until then the Council, unlike the Commission, had remained a largely secretive forum for intergovernmental bargaining, measures were adopted to make public the results and explanations of votes as well as the minutes of the Council's legislative meetings. 6 Nevertheless, the process of EU Treaty reform had remained subject to not only the control of the member states, but also the opaque IGC method.
Crucially, this method was beginning to show clear signs of need for reform.
The IGC: A Method that Failed
Despite the efforts of the national governments, the Treaties of Amsterdam and Nice failed to resolve the crucial issue of institutional reform. The IGC method had retained its pivotal position despite explicit calls (European Parliament, 1997) for a public debate to identify the idea that would mobilize European citizens and a more active role of the directly elected EP in treaty reform. Although IGCs had retained the characteristics of a -14 -forum for inter-state diplomatic negotiations in which individual governments sought to increase their gains without necessarily taking into account the broader picture (Giscard d'Estaing, 2002: 14) , perceptions were gradually changing as a result of the experience of the late 1990s. The 'shambles' that emerged from the Nice summit convinced even the most enthusiastic supporter of the IGC method about its limits (Norman, 2003: 24) . assessments reflect, in part, the acrimonious end of the negotiations, but they also show growing unease about the fact that, having failed -by design -the transparency test, the IGC model could no longer be defended on grounds of efficiency. Indeed, the Treaty of Nice was 'widely reviled as a highly unsatisfactory agreement' (Dinan, 2004: 27) . This is unsurprising 7 given the conflicts between various provisions and the Government, other groups of Convention members -such as the members of the EPcould be expected to operate in a homogenous manner. Second, although national governments retained the right to make the final decisions in the IGC scheduled to follow the end of the Convention's proceedings, they did not have the power to prevent the creation of a broad consensus within the Convention. Indeed, the Chairman was quick to note that consensus does not mean unanimity
13
. This sheds light on the risk they took when they created the Convention and, by extension, the impact of the norm of transparent and democratic government. The new institutional arrangement differed from the opaque IGCs in that it had placed great emphasis on public deliberation. It -19 -was designed to operate largely on the basis of each member's capacity to utilise arguments that focus on the public interest -in line with the logic of deliberative democracy (Elster, 1998a: 104) . In addition, the choice between drafting a set of options and a single document was left to the Convention. This constrained the autonomy of national governments in the subsequent IGC. Individual governments could not criticise the Convention for going beyond its remit. Given the Convention's public and deliberative characteristics, national governments would find it particularly difficult to diverge radically from its outcome. 14 The participation of representatives of
Heads of State or Government meant that the Convention could not be dismissed easily
(at least at the point of its creation) as a 'talking shop' since the politically relevant actors were there. Third, the Convention was likely to be a more challenging institutional environment than an IGC for states with coalition 15 governments in that it was less likely than an IGC to be permissive for the co-ordination problems that they typically face. Finally, the agenda of the Convention was broad 16 and -despite British opposition -it had a clear constitutional dimension (Magnette and Nicolaïdis, 2004: 387-8) . This agenda placed a particular burden on the actors who had many 'red lines' to defend. Prominent among them were the British and the Danish governments that would normally be expected to veto this reform precisely because it could not be reasonably certain to avoid unintended consequences. So, why did they consent to it?
Rhetorical Entrapment and the Impact of Norms
-20 - 2004: 385) . Why did they consent to it when they knew that in the very recent past they had underestimated the capacity of this mechanism to operate autonomously?
Opposing the new institutional arrangement in public was not just 'politically difficult' (Menon, 2003: 964) for the sceptical governments -it was politically untenable because Sustained references to the need to make the EU more accountable -which meant that the aforementioned norm provided the standard against which alternative institutional arrangements had to be assessed -and Tony Blair's consistent and confident statements regarding the direction of European integration 23 meant that the creation of the second Convention could be seen as a credibility test both in the domestic and the European arenas. Claiming, as he did in Ghent, that 'as the EU has matured and has taken on more powers (…) the people of Europe have rightly come to expect more of a say in how it is run' (Blair, 2000a) and raising directly the issue of 'what people want from -23 -Europe' in conjunction with the need to ensure that 'the citizens of Europe must feel that they own Europe' (Blair, 2000b) its preferred alternative (a group of wise men) could be defended on grounds of efficiency as well as its almost completely absent potential for unintended consequences (which is why it appealed to the British government) but it was not compatible -or not as compatible as the Convention -with the norm of transparency and democratic accountability.
As a result, a change of strategy (and the active involvement in the second Convention) 24 was the only route that remained available to the British government.
This route was consistent with the policy of active engagement in the process of integration introduced by the Labour government in 1997. At the same time, the second Convention could be defended (at the point of its creation) in the domestic context precisely because of its emphasis on transparency and democratic accountability. This -24 -is why Tony Blair ended up welcoming its creation in a statement in the House of
Commons as an opportunity to maximise the input of public opinion into the proceedings (Blair, 2001b) . Though he was quick to reassure the House of Commons that the second Convention would simply 'present options' 25 (although this was not certain at that point in time) and that the final decisions would be made by the national governments, it is certain that active engagement remained his real strategy because having to veto the single document prepared by a legitimate Convention would be damaging, both domestically and in the European context. Indeed, not only would it return Britain to its position of isolation bequeathed to the Labour government by its
Conservative predecessor but it would also undermine the credibility of Tony Blair's statements that he and his government were 'winning the argument in Europe'.
The Limits of Alternative Explanations
Neither interest-based, nor institutionalist accounts can resolve the puzzle discussed
here. An interest-based account would highlight four points. First, a legitimate and effective Convention can be seen as an opportunity to promote the interests of a government that is 'winning the argument' but only if the Convention were to remain under control. However, as the example of the first Convention clearly demonstrates, this could not be guaranteed
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. Second, it is important to distinguish between the decision taken in Nice to reform the process and the specific content of the reform agreed upon a year later. The former was, clearly, in the interests of national governments who knew that the IGC method had reached its limits. Nonetheless, this -25 -cannot explain the precise form of the new arrangement created a year after the Nice summit, without recourse to the norm of transparent and democratically accountable governance and its problem solving and legitimating features. Third, the Laeken Declaration was adopted despite the presence of alternatives (including a group of 'wise men' preferred by the British government) and without any links to side payments or package deals. Finally, although national parliamentarians, the EP and the Commission welcomed the second Convention -since it gave them the opportunity to participate in this process, they did not have the power to affect the decision taken in Laeken.
Institutionalist analyses would focus on path dependence, decision rules and control on the basis of six arguments. First, the precedent set by the first Convention can be seen as an important factor both in terms of legitimacy and problem solving. However, it
was not a major determinant per se because some national governments had had an unhappy experience and were, by consequence, aware of the capacity of the new institutional arrangement to produce unintended consequences. Arguably, the first Convention showed that the new mechanism was a credible option and this is consistent with the normative account presented in this article
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. Second, the Convention on the Future of Europe had a much more difficult and politically salient task and opportunity namely, the preparation of options or a single treaty document. This task differed remarkably from the consolidation work for which the first Convention had been established. Furthermore, the broader trend towards 'democratisation' at the level of the EU did not determine the outcome of the process examined here. After all, other areas in which there was sustained demand for a more active role for the EP have remained under the almost total control of the national governments and the EP's calls for a more -26 -transparent method of treaty reform had been ignored during the 1990s (Dimitrakopoulos, 2005) . In addition, the growing legislative powers of the EP clashed with the views of governing elites who claim that EU politics must remain under the control of governments because 'democratic accountability is fundamentally and ultimately rooted in the Member State' (Blair, 2001b) . Third, given the unanimity requirement, the decision examined here could have been vetoed since opposition to the substance of the proposed new arrangement was neither limited to a small state nor Assembly (Kleine, 2005: 12) and he was flanked 28 by two equally (if not more)
experienced Vice-Chairmen who were likely to provide a counter-balance 29 along with a large majority (within the Praesidium) composed of 'natural allies' of supranational organisations like the Commission (Norman, 2003: 161) .
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Conclusion
The Despite opposition from sceptical national governments that had the motives, power and opportunity to veto this reform, the important reform went ahead because its opponents knew that opposing a mechanism that was capable of resolving a political problem in a legitimate way was simply a politically untenable position because of the deployment of the norm of transparent and democratic governance. Trapped in their own rhetoric and their opponents' successful rhetorical action, sceptical governments were induced to adapt their strategy.
In that sense, this article has sought to go beyond the existing work that identifies the consequential features of norms and has highlighted the importance of an important mechanism, namely rhetorical action. The case examined here relates to two more general points. First, norms-based accounts can accommodate agency. Such accounts are often seen as the antithesis of 'rationalist' analyses. This case demonstrates that political actors behave rationally but their action is channelled by the normative basis of -28 -the political opportunity structure in which they operate. Actors choose from a socially constructed 'menu' of options. They also choose the pace and the scope of change 31 .
Second, the impact of norms is inherently political, i.e. not the smooth and orderly progression often associated with ideational accounts of political change. Unlike other normative accounts that place emphasis on the importance of persuasion and consensus, this article shows that the impact of norms is the result of political contestation (Parsons, 2003: 237-8) and rhetorical action. Change is neither smooth, nor predetermined. Rather, it is contingent (Katzenstein, 1993: 286-9) and the result of a process triggered by failure of existing institutions. It is precisely because compliance with norms is not guaranteed and norms compete with other norms that we need to identify the specific mechanisms through which they affect political outcomes. 12 It is important to note here that the reference to the notion of minority is not intended to indicate the possibility (or likelihood) of a formal vote. Rather, it denotes the mismatch (demonstrated in the empirical discussion) between the opponents' (such as the British government) domestic rhetoric which was focused on control and, more generally, their capacity to win the argument, and the significant risks that emanated from the aforementioned reform.
13 My translation from Magnette (2002: 11) .
14 If a set of options enjoyed large support within the Convention, it was likely to have a similar constraining effect on national governments.
15 This is why at least two of these states insisted that representatives of the Heads of State or Government, not governments, be one of the Convention's 'composantes' (interviews, Brussels, 7 July 2003).
-30 - 16 It included four broad sets of important issues namely, the division and definition of competence in the EU, the simplification of the EU's legal instruments, how to improve democracy, transparency and efficiency in the EU and, finally, a Constitution for European citizens. . 19 The second Convention was 'an attempt to avoid another Nice' as a British official put it (interview, London, 15 March 2004) . 20 The new institutional arrangement placed the onus on them too to move away from a largely reactive and protest-based attitude towards a more constructive one. The fact that both institutional actors and civil society had multiple access points further enhanced the legitimacy of the new institutional arrangement.
21 This is why they were not particularly happy with the process (interviews, London, 9 and 15 March 2004). 22 The first Convention produced a complete Charter of Rights that went beyond the mere codification of the acquis (Magnette and Nicolaïdis, 2004: 384) . 23 'I believe that argument is moving increasingly in our favour' (The Observer, 16 December 2001: 19 26 Indeed, even the distinction between drafting options and preparing a single document can be challenged on these grounds. 27 Thus, explaining the creation of the second Convention purely on the basis of 'rhetorical action' (i.e.
the strategic use of norms-based arguments) would ignore the key second component highlighted here namely, the problem solving capacity of the proposed reform.
28 After the beginning of the Convention proceedings he stated in public that the involvement of civil society (itself the result of the openness promoted by the new institutional arrangement) would reinforce the outcome of the Convention vis-à-vis the European Council in the subsequent IGC (Magnette, 2002: 10) .
29 This is why President Chirac was not happy with their appointment that was a compromise he had to accept in order to ensure Giscard's appointment (nterview, Brussels, 30 April 2004) . In fact, the discussion regarding (a) Giscard's appointment and (b) the agenda of the Convention facilitated the Belgian Presidency's task of diverting attention from the creation of the second Convention. 30 For example, Closa argued that '[t]he composition and kind of issues dealt with at the Convention […] induced a change in the internal processes of exchange among actors.
[…] Large membership meant that in order to construct broad supporting coalitions (that could change from issue to issue), actors had to avoid arguments based on vested interests and seek persuasion based on strong arguments appealing to superior moral reason.'
31 Although important powers have been granted to the EP since 1986 and the pace of change has accelerated since 1991, important exceptions remain in place (see Dimitrakopoulos, 2005) .
